INTRODUCTION
Many Americans would venture that their constitutional rights are absolute, but that is generally not the case. 1 Through the principles established under the often-used de minimis doctrine, courts continue to struggle with allowing constitutional breaches in the name of government interest. Under the doctrine, a violation may be held to be so minimal as to not be of the concern of the law. The Supreme Court has noted, "There is, of * Founder and author of Cybercrime Review (www.cybercrimereview.com); J.D., University of Mississippi. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Clancy for his contributions to my interest in Fourth Amendment law and his helpful guidance on prior drafts of this Article.
1 Some constitutional rights are absolute. See, e.g., Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 2 (1972) (noting that a person charged with a felony has an absolute constitutional right to an attorney).
course a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned." 2 When evaluating Fourth Amendment violations under the de minimis doctrine, the results are much more serious than in some other areas. Such abuses may result in criminal punishment if the intrusion is deemed reasonable and suppression if it is not. However, that is not to say that there is anything wrong with the application, as the Fourth Amendment cannot be construed as absolute in the same way that other constitutional rights may be-the word "unreasonable" 3 prevents that. An absolute Fourth Amendment right would prevent all searches and seizures without an appropriate warrant. The Court addressed this issue in Illinois v. McArthur, holding, in a lengthy explanation, "We nonetheless have made it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable." 4 The Supreme Court has only applied the de minimis doctrine in a relatively small number of cases. Through studying these cases, it becomes apparent that no tests exist and large gaps appear, causing great uncertainty as to whether the de minimis principle applies. With even fewer Fourth Amendment cases to evaluate, the application becomes more and more uncertain. This Article will explore the situations in which the Court has determined if the de minimis doctrine applies. The various attempts to apply the principle have left lower courts struggling to follow suit, and as this Article will explain, rightfully so. Though allowing de minimis intrusions are necessary and an application of common sense to our law, it is nearly impossible to set bright line rules that delineate when an unconstitutional Fourth Amendment event is de minimis.
I. HISTORY OF THE DE MINIMIS DOCTRINE
The de minimis doctrine is a somewhat recent tool used by the Supreme Court of the United States. The term itself was first used in 1796 5 and was then ignored entirely by the Court until 1865. 6 The full maxim, de minimis non curat lex, means "[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles." 7 Courts may use the doctrine to find that a claim is so trivial that a decision need not be made on the merits of the case. 8 "Litigants lose when their stance is cast as trivial or when they fail to persuade the judge that their adversary has made a trivial claim." 9 Several inconsistencies concerning the doctrine should first be mentioned. Certainly the Court will not always use the exact phrase "de minimis," and as such, it has developed a few synonyms. 10 Understandably, "minimal," "modest," and "miniscule" may be used to the same effect as de minimis. 11 "Technical" 12 is also synonymous. Further, the doctrine can be used in two distinct ways-it can protect the government's interests or the citizen's liberty. A conservative court or judge will often apply the doctrine for the former purpose; liberals often opt for the latter. 13 This section examines major themes of the de minimis doctrine and attempts to explain the boundaries established by the Court. Throughout the Supreme Court's history, the doctrine's application has more or less been limited to a variety of issues. This Article will show why the Court uses it as it does and refuses to extend it to other areas. In some instances, the Court has endeavored to set some bright line rules concerning what is de minimis and what is not. These rules provide some guidelines but leave much to be desired.
A. Major Areas of Application
Several themes of de minimis jurisprudence are easily discernible as one wades through the Supreme Court cases on the subject. The majority of cases involve numbers, whether time, percentages, people, or money. Therefore, as our economy expanded, and American workers lost more and more money through taxes and began receiving more rights through labor unions, the doctrine was used to squash or strengthen many arguments. The voting rights era saw application of the de minimis doctrine to assist in the determination of what deviations in apportionment plans were acceptable. More recently, the doctrine has been applied to issues such as copyright violations, the First Amendment freedoms, the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
The first significant area of de minimis doctrine application began in 1895 concerning taxation. Maricopa & P. R. Co. v. Territory of Arizona dealt with a company's refusal to pay approximately $1,200 in taxes for railroad tracks located on an Indian reservation. 14 The "small amount" of the penalty on this tax was held to be de minimis. 15 constitutionality of a stamp tax on foreign bills of lading. 17 The Court noted, "A 10-cent tax or duty is in conflict with that provision as certainly as a 100-dollar tax or duty. Constitutional mandates are imperative. The question is never one of amount, but one of power. The applicable maxim is, 'Obsta principiis,' 18 not, 'De minimis non curat lex.'" 19 Therefore, the tax was struck down as there was a violation of the Constitution, regardless of how de minimis it might be. 20 Beginning in the 1940s, the de minimis doctrine began to be applied to unions and labor cases. In Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., a lower court held that White Plains was not subject to the relevant statute, because the defendant's business was rather small, and only 0.5% of its business was interstate. 21 However, the Supreme Court found that because Congress made no distinction on business size, application of the de minimis doctrine was inappropriate. 22 Another case the same year held that employees could be docked fifteen minutes of pay because it took that much time to get to their stations from the time clock. 23 However, the Court noted that if the time difference were seconds or even a few minutes, it would likely be a de minimis amount. 24 17 Id. at 283. The issue was whether the tax violated the provision that "[n]o tax or duty shall be laid on any Articles exported from any state." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
18 "Obsta principiis" means to " Court maintains that de minimis exceptions should only be allowed in "unavoidable" instances. 34 The 40 Id. Justice O'Connor continued, "Given the values that the Establishment Clause was meant to serve, however, I believe that government can, in a discrete category of cases, acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending the suggestion has been held to be inaccurate, as the Court has found that such violations are permissible as long as the restriction has "sufficient tailoring or justification." 41 Another use of the doctrine concerns the use of force against inmates. The Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" 42 was found to hold that use of physical force was de minimis unless it was force "repugnant to the conscience of mankind." 43 In Hudson v. McMillian, the Supreme Court held that an inmate's "bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate [were] not de minimis," 44 though the Fifth Circuit considered them "minor" and found that "minor harms do not rise to constitutional proportions." 45 The Court also reversed a Fourth Circuit decision that found a de minimis use of force in Wilkins v. Gaddy. 46 In Wilkins, the petitioner's injuries from being slammed onto a concrete floor, punched, kicked, kneed, and choked included a bruised heel, lower-back pain, increased blood pressure, migraine headaches, dizziness, depression, panic attacks, and nightmares of the assault. 47 Beyond these major categories, the de minimis doctrine has been applied to a variety of other situations. Copyright infringement is often excused as de minimis. 48 clipping to send to a friend" or "pinning a quotation on one's bulletin board" has a de minimis effect on the author.). characterized as de minimis." 49 The ten-day suspension of a student was found not to be de minimis and may have violated the student's right to due process in Goss v. Lopez. 50 Requiring justices of the peace to wait two years to run for the legislature is a de minimis burden on political aspirations. 51 " [T] he requirement that [a DUI] offender attend an alcohol abuse education course can only be described as de minimis." 52 These varied applications of the doctrine show the flexibility that courts may use in its application.
It took many years for the de minimis doctrine to become a powerful force in Supreme Court jurisprudence, but today, it is active in many areas. These expansions often occurred as our country moved through significant periods in our history. The development of unions and industry was the first. The civil rights era brought about application in voter disenfranchisement cases. The civil liberties movement and strong media presence of the last few decades brought about the doctrine's First Amendment application. And though difficult to ascertain, technology could surely be our next huge growth. Nonetheless, the question remains: how much is too much? When is an act de minimis, and when will the fury of the Constitution reign down, invalidating a search or seizure? Though this is not an easy answer, the Supreme Court has given us some limited guidance.
B. The Amount of De Minimis
As mentioned infra, the de minimis doctrine is often used in regard to numbers-and understandably so. Numbers cases can be divided into three categories: (1) cases in which a percentage of the total is found to be de minimis, (2) cases where a total dollar amount is de minimis, and (3) cases. 53 Better understanding of the ranges allowed by the Supreme Court in each category is necessary in order to discern the impact the de minimis doctrine has on the law generally, particularly with later discussions on the Fourth Amendment. Several de minimis cases have been decided based on the percentage of the relevant amount when compared to the whole. In Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court held that $70 out of $1,000,000 (0.007%) was a de minimis amount. 54 The Court later ruled that acquiring ten of a total 3,500 stores (0.286%) was de minimis. 55 Also, 0.3% of a market share fits well within the doctrine. 56 In 1865, the Court found that damage to 1/144th (0.694%) of a ship was de minimis. 57 In Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight
Handlers, Express & Station Employees, the Court held that 0.7% of an annual budget was de minimis, though the amount was not exempted from the statute in question. 58 Therefore, there seems to be a general consensus that only fractions of a percent will count as de minimis, though the Court has not considered the issue with higher amounts.
On other occasions, the Court has used the de minimis doctrine when considering a single amount or number of items, rather than those as parts of a whole. 59 For example, in Tumey v. Ohio, the Court evaluated whether payment of a judge only when a defendant is convicted can be ignored since the payment was so small as to be de minimis. 60 Finding that the judge received 53 For information about voting rights cases, see supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. These cases are not discussed in this section (and especially with the percentage cases), because they are a very distinct group. The Court would almost certainly never consider ten percent a de minimis amount in any other situation. 54 Therefore, while not all de minimis uses involve numerical values, there are those that do give some guidance as to when the Court is willing to make the application. In dealing with percentages, the Court has consistently held that those lower than 0.7% are within the de minimis range. However, this is not to say that a higher percentage could not be found to also be de minimis. It should also be noted that the Court often raises the de minimis doctrine sua sponte, and that, therefore, the lack of application to higher percentages may be a showing of their unwillingness to go any higher. With regard to monetary amounts that are not a part of a specific amount, the application is less defined and much more difficult to apply to other situations. Certainly, a few cents is determined to be de minimis, and amounts of thousands of dollars are not, but the Court is silent on the gap between the two (see Figure 1 ). There are other occasions where an individual number (such as fish) can be found de minimis. This usage is applied on a case-by-case basis. Finally, Wyoming v. Oklahoma suggests that there are situations in which an amount may comply with the percentage requirement to be de minimis, but the amount itself is so large that it does not qualify.
These understandings concerning the history of the de minimis doctrine will help guide our exploration into the relatively recent application to Fourth Amendment principles. De minimis standards are used to hold that violations of the laweven the Constitution-are tolerable, as long as they remain minimal. Despite Justice O'Connor's suggestion that "[t]here are no de minimis violations of the Constitution," 68 the Supreme Court's rulings hold otherwise. Hence, it is necessary to recognize the de minimis standard and amounts in order to determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation-time, amounts, immeasurable intrusions, or otherwise-has crossed the mostly invisible line between de minimis and unreasonable.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE DE MINIMIS DOCTRINE TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
While the first use of the term "de minimis" appeared in a United States case in 1796, 69 it was not until 1977 that the term would first appear within the context of the Fourth Amendment. 70 Since that time, the application has "flourished" in that the Court has used the phrase in a handful of cases. These cases cover a variety of subjects concerning the reasonability of searches and seizures, and when combined with previous uses of the doctrine, we are better able to understand how the Court determines whether an otherwise Fourth Amendment act is de minimis. In some situations, "cases have turned on the Court's view that the individual's interest invaded is so attenuated that there has been no search or seizure within the meaning of the Amendment . . . . There are other cases where the Court has indicated that the intrusion may be so minimal that it would summarily reject claims of unreasonableness." 71 Thus, there are two applications of the de minimis doctrine to the Fourth Amendment-the first involves situations in which the intrusion was so minimal as to be deemed no intrusion at all, and the second, situations where the court will recognize an intrusion but find it to be reasonable.
Certainly, an issue for discussion is whether such intrusions should be allowed. As Justice O'Connor mentioned, it is perhaps true that no de minimis violations of the Constitution should be allowed, but our jurisprudence does not explicitly acknowledge 68 this. 72 In United States v. Bailey, the Sixth Circuit argued, in a lengthy explanation, that de minimis intrusions are only allowed if they do not violate a legitimate expectation of privacy. 73 We consider it irrelevant whether a particular governmental intrusion is classified as a "search" or as a "seizure." What matters is whether it violates an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. Therefore, it is not necessary to speculate whether a beeper "searches" or "seizes" anything. Furthermore, the fourth amendment does not overlook de minimis intrusions. An intrusion is not de minimis if it violates an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. The Government's argument that beeper surveillance is too minor an intrusion to constitute a search begs the question: the intrusion is minor only if it does not violate protected individual privacy. 74 At least one Supreme Court justice has also mentioned that acceptance by society is not a justification for such minimal intrusions. In Justice Brennan's dissent in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, he opined:
I would hazard a guess that today's opinion will be received favorably by a majority of our society, who would willingly suffer the minimal intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint stop in order to prevent drunken driving. But consensus that a particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable purpose has never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis. 75 However, despite these worthy arguments, the Supreme Court has overruled them in order to protect interests they consider more indispensable than one's Fourth Amendment protections.
Like other uses of the de minimis doctrine, Fourth Amendment cases can be divided into several categories for easier 72 Newdow, 542 U.S. at 36-37. 73 understanding. 76 Some cases seek to apply the standard to a number-whether a part of an object or an amount of time. Others attempt to measure the intrusion of an act which cannot be measured in numbers, but rather make an objective, reasonableness evaluation of the situation. This Article will first examine the former group of cases.
A. Easily Measurable Intrusions
The case of United States v. Jacobsen concerned the reasonableness of destroying part of the defendant's property. 77 A package was damaged during shipping, and FedEx employees "observed a white powdery substance . . . . They summoned a federal agent, who removed a trace of the powder, subjected it to a chemical test and determined that it was cocaine. The question presented was whether the Fourth Amendment required the agent to obtain a warrant before he did so." 78 The Supreme Court concluded that the original seizure of the package was reasonable, but acknowledged that a lawful seizure "can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on 'unreasonable seizures.'" 79 The appropriate test requires the Court to "balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." 80 Finding that the government had a substantial interest in the procedure, the cocaine was lawfully detained, and only a trace of it was taken in the test, the violation was de minimis and did not render the seizure unreasonable. 81 Therefore, the trace of cocaine, which went unnoticed by the defendants, was akin to 0.7% or $0.04 in 76 While the historical section of this Article was limited to Supreme Court cases specifically mentioning the term "de minimis," this section will expand that to include related terms such as "minimal intrusion. other cases where the amount was de minimis. 82 The miniscule amount, though technically a violation of the Fourth Amendment, was excused as de minimis because "the safeguards of a warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment interests." 83 In a case similar to Jacobsen, Cardwell v. Lewis looked at the destruction of the defendant's property to determine whether it was of a de minimis nature. 84 After a lawful arrest, Lewis's car was seized and examined by police. 85 In an attempt to connect him to a wreck with another vehicle, the examiner removed some paint from the exterior of Lewis's car. 86 The Court held that since there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the paint samples, their seizure for examination was reasonable. 87 Cardwell. 88 Thus, paint samples may be considered de minimis, but vacuum sweepings are not, creating what seems like a very fine line in the application of de minimis standards.
In Connally v. Georgia, the Court examined whether a justice of the peace receiving $5.00 per search warrant he issued violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 89 Connally had been convicted of possession of marijuana. 90 The Georgia Supreme Court held, "[W]e are not persuaded that a Justice of the Peace would violate his oath to earn a $5.00 fee and are inclined to the view that the amount involved in issuing or refusing to issue a search warrant falls within the de minimis rule. The justice of the peace testified that he had refused to issue search warrants on some occasions." 91 However, the United States Supreme Court found the amount not to be de minimis and therefore held that the issuance of the search warrant violated Connally's constitutional rights. 92 Two important distinctions should be made with Connally as compared to the other measurable cases. First, the de minimis doctrine was used to protect the defendant here, rather than to provide justification for the government action. Therefore, Connally cannot be read as holding that any amount above $5.00 is not de minimis generally, but instead that such a low amount can be considered not to fall within the doctrine when-and only when-it is being used to protect the defendant. 93 Secondly, while one warrant earned the justice only $5.00, the justice had issued over 10,000 within a couple of years, amounting to a substantial amount of money. 94 The larger sum (over $50,000) could have 88 Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 594 n.9 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (finding that since Coolidge's car could not be seized following his arrest in his home-despite various justifications from the state-the seizure of vacuum sweepings was not so minimal as to allow the evidence to be admissible)). 89 Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of this distinction as it applies to the de minimis doctrine, generally. 94 Connally, 429 U.S. at 356 n.3 (noting that from January 1, 1973 until the time of the pre-trial hearing, the justice had issued over 10,000 warrants. However, the Court did not note the date of the hearing.).
unquestionably been a factor in the Court's judgment on the de minimis issue. 95 Several cases have attempted to define when a length of time for a search or seizure becomes unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and is no longer a de minimis intrusion. Such evaluations are divided as to whether the protected object under the Amendment was a person or either a house, paper, or effect, as shown in Figure 2, Where inanimate objects are concerned, detention is merely the period during which government agents exercise dominion and control over the property. Detention of an inanimate object is one-dimensional; it may vary only in length of time. Intrusion, however, is two-dimensional; it can vary both in its nature and extent. Indeed, an intrusion may be so insignificant as to go unnoticed and thus have only a de minimis impact on any protected property interest. Consequently, though the duration of a detention is an important consideration in evaluating the intrusiveness of a package's determent, it is neither the mirror image of unreasonableness nor the yardstick against which the suitability of police procedures must inevitably be measured. In the ordinary case, a judge will not be able to calculate whether an intrusion goes beyond the pale merely by holding a stop watch to a sequence of events.
Id. at 7.
The First Circuit went on to specify three factors that determine reasonability of the time that a seizure may be continued, including: "(1) investigatory diligence, (2) length of detention, and (3) information conveyed to the suspect. . . . While there is some play among these factors, each has a theoretical outer limit which alone might render detention unconstitutional." Id. The Fourth Circuit has a five-factor test for its application of Place:
(1) [T]he duration of time the suspect is delayed by the stop; (2) whether the police acted diligently; (3) whether the detention of the subject of the search was unnecessarily prolonged; (4) whether the authorities made it absolutely clear that they planned to reunite the suspect and his possessions at some future time, and how they planned to do it; and (5) the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. An ever-developing issue today is that of electronic surveillance-either through cell site location information (CSLI) or a global positioning system (GPS) device. In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court, in a decision by Justice Scalia, refused to hold that monitoring Jones's location for twenty-eight days alone was a Fourth Amendment event. 105 In a concurring opinion, Justice Alito argued, "We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the four week mark. Other cases may present more difficult questions." 106 Thus, Justice Alito would argue that there is an amount of time that would be considered de minimis under the Fourth Amendment and its application of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. However, Justice Scalia countered:
And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a 4 week investigation is "surely" too long and why a drugtrafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an "extraordinary offens[e]" which may permit longer observation. What of a 2 day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6 month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple with these "vexing problems" in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here. 107 Scalia's argument is precisely the problem with using the de minimis doctrine with the Fourth Amendment. Many factors have to be considered, such as the severity of the crime or the length of the time monitored, and to have law enforcement or even magistrates to decide the issue on their own under a totality of the circumstances test leaves much to be desired. Nonetheless, courts (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that although some questioning unrelated to a traffic stop is allowed, such questioning that more than doubles the stop created an unreasonable seizure, although the questioning was only thirteen minutes, much less than the de minimis limit established by the Model Code); see also supra note 101. 105 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 106 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 107 Id. at 954 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
are struggling with this precise issue, holding that certain uses of GPS or CSLI data are unconstitutional precisely because of the amount of time the surveillance was used. 108 These cases involving measurable quantities represent the clearest rules under the de minimis principle. With time, the Court has set some guidelines with what is reasonable based on the object protected, but it remains uncertain whether these are the outer bounds of reasonableness. Connally provides some parameters, but also raises many other questions as well. Jacobsen, Cardwell, and Coolidge are slightly more determinative, standing for the Place test that requires a balancing between the minimization of intrusions and the protection of governmental interests. Finally, Jones raises lots of questions and provides no answers, leaving those for another day.
B. Measuring the Immeasurable
While de minimis numbers cases have proven to be rather difficult for lower courts to apply, 109 the second group of cases presents much more difficulty. It is one thing to have a case with a clear measurement-whether an amount of time or a part of a defendant's property being taken. However, when determining whether, for example, a specific action by law enforcement is a de [C] ourts have concluded that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when the government surveillance of historical cell site location data occurs over a sufficiently long-albeit undefined-period of time so as to implicate a person's legitimate expectation of privacy. None of these decisions have explicitly defined the length of time at which a request for cell site location data must be supported by probable cause, but . . . [one judge] suggested that thirty days might be an appropriate limit. 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012). Cell site data is much less accurate than GPS data, and that fact may allow for a longer time period to be allowed for CSLI than GPS data. Interestingly, with the remand of the Jones case, the government is taking Mr. Jones back to trial-this time seeking to use four months of CSLI data in lieu of the twenty-eight days of GPS data produced in the first case. Jeffrey Brown, Jones II: This Time, the Government Seeks to Use Cell Site Location Information, CYBERCRIME REVIEW (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.cybercrimereview.com/2012/04/jones-ii-cell-sitelocation-data.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
109 Supra notes 82, 97, 100-03.
minimis intrusion, the results become much more uncertain. Just as in the cases with more measurable results, these intrusions are at a level "with which the Constitution is not concerned." 110 In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the defendant was pulled over for driving with an expired license plate. 111 Officers asked Mimms to step out of the car and, upon doing so, they saw a bulge in his clothing that appeared to be a weapon. 112 He was subsequently charged and convicted of carrying a concealed deadly weapon and carrying a firearm without a license. 113 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that asking Mimms to exit his vehicle "was an impermissible seizure." 114 However, on appeal before the United States Supreme Court, the Court ruled that "the intrusion into the driver's personal liberty occasioned . . . by the order to get out of the car . 118 One of the more common issues of de minimis application today is in regard to the reasonableness of the use of force. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held, "'Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers,' violates the Fourth Amendment." 119 To determine what types of force or injuries 120 will be deemed de minimis, courts, considering "the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments . . . about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation," will evaluate "whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to 118 Id. In another string of cases, courts have looked at whether Mimms can be used to find that a minimally intrusive Fourth Amendment event without reasonable suspicionsuch as an unlawful traffic stop-can be found to be de minimis. In Bingham v. City of Manhattan, for example, the officer was accused of pulling over the plaintiff without having observed a traffic violation. The officer, however, argued that absent wrongful motivation on the basis of race, an unlawful traffic stop is de minimis. The court found, "An unlawful traffic stop, however, is not such a de minimis violation." 341 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2003). In Richardson v. Newark, the court, attempting to answer the question of "whether unlawful traffic stops are sufficiently intrusive to be of constitutional magnitude or, stated another way, whether freedom from arbitrary traffic stops is a constitutionally protected right," held that they would not apply the de minimis doctrine to unlawful traffic stops without precedent to the contrary. their underlying intent or motivation." 121 As in Graham, most of these cases arise in a § 1983 action in which a plaintiff attempts to recover damages for injuries sustained from the use of excessive force during a search or seizure. 122 The constitutionality of a protective sweep 123 was evaluated in Maryland v. Buie. 124 In its discussion, the Court found Terry compelling. 125 In Terry, the Court held, "Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." 126 Thus, as recognized in Buie, this intrusion of a Terry frisk was not de minimis. 127 Nevertheless, the search of the defendant's house in conjunction with the execution of an arrest warrant was held to be constitutional. 128 The Court held:
But we permitted the intrusion, which was no more than necessary to protect the officer from harm. Nor do we here suggest, as the State does, that entering rooms not examined prior to the arrest is a de minimis intrusion that may be disregarded. We are quite sure, however, that the arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest. That interest is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail. 129 The Court seems to acknowledge that even in situations in which the intrusion is above the level they are willing to consider de minimis, an intrusion will still be held reasonable if done in the interest of officer safety.
Several other issues have been addressed briefly. One such topic is whether physical touching can be de minimis, and therefore, meaning no seizure has occurred. In United States v. Mendenhall, the Supreme Court noted that "some physical touching of the person of the citizen" may result in a seizure. 130 Therefore, there are certainly forms of touching that do not result in a seizure, but the Supreme Court has not expanded on this issue. 131 Another issue was addressed in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association. 132 In Skinner, the Court held that although drug testing amounted to a search within the Fourth Amendment, "the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest [is] furthered by the intrusion," no suspicion is necessary. 133 While the de minimis doctrine has only been used in a relatively small number of Supreme Court cases concerning the Fourth Amendment, the information we can glean from them about the doctrine is very important. Jacobsen alone has been cited forty-six times concerning its application of the de minimis principle and continues to be very influential. 134 Typically, the doctrine is used to excuse a Fourth Amendment violation, often in the interest of ensuring the safety of law enforcement (such as with the use of force, ordering passengers out of a vehicle, or protective sweeps). In other situations, it is used as a way to validate an otherwise unconstitutional search or seizure. However, like with the de minimis doctrine, generally, several gaps have yet to be filled and several issues yet to be discovered as far as Supreme Court jurisprudence is concerned.
III. USE OF PRECEDENT TO CREATE RULES AND ANALYZE NEW ISSUES
As this Article has shown, the Court's guidance on the application of the de minimis doctrine is rather scattered and unhelpful. In Justice Stevens's dissent in Citizens United, he encouraged the development of de minimis tests for campaign financing. 135 Likewise, it is possible to develop a few tests that are applicable within the context of the Fourth Amendment. However, there are some conceivable instances in which reasonableness of an Amendment event would vary on a case-by-case basis, so tests are difficult. 136 There are several ways in which these issues could be solved. The current system seems to be one of complete reasonableness on a case-by-case basis. The Court uses the doctrine when and where it chooses with little explanation or guidelines for future cases. One solution is to set a de minimis level of intrusion that will be allowed, and everything below that level is constitutionally acceptable. However, this would be difficult to apply as there are numerous circumstances that could arise that would necessitate law enforcement breaking this level in an otherwise reasonable manner. Another option is to set floor and ceiling amounts, and allow courts to fill in the gap on a case-by-case basis. This provides some guidelines for law enforcement, but allows courts to look at all of the interests under a Place-like balancing test. Also, courts could take Justice O'Connor's opinion 137 and proceed under the notion that there are no de minimis violations to the Constitution and that even the slightest abuse results in, among other remedies, suppression of evidence. Conversely, and finally, we could also assume that all violations are de minimis and should be deemed reasonable based on the best judgment of law enforcement. The pros and cons of these possibilities become apparent when discussed within an example.
At the time the Fourth Amendment was written, the world was a different place. A search could only result in a cost to the 136 In United States v. Everett, the Sixth Circuit refused to create a bright line rule that any amount of questioning unrelated to a traffic stop was unconstitutional.
Because the vast weight of authority is against a bright-line rule, and because such a rule would not even serve its intended purpose as a bulwark against pretextual police activity, we join our sister circuits in declining to . . .
[impose] a categorical ban on suspicionless unrelated questioning that may minimally prolong a traffic stop." 601 F.3d. 484, 492 (6th Cir. 2010).
The court continued in its analysis, refusing to set a bright line rule for de minimis activity as well: "[H]aving just refused to set a bright line at zero, we cannot very well select another arbitrary quantity of time and proclaim that any prolongation less than that amount is categorically 'de minimis'-as convenient as such a rule might be." Id. at 493 (emphasis omitted).
137 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 (2004).
person being searched in a limited number of ways. Today, many costs are passed on during a search. Suppose law enforcement lawfully obtains a search warrant for John's south Florida home and arrive to execute it in the early afternoon. John left for vacation with the air conditioner turned off, and the sweltering July heat has raised the temperature to around 105 degrees. Unable to work otherwise, the officers turn the air conditioner on the lowest temperature on the thermostat. Police conduct their search, find an abundance of cocaine, and leave, neglecting to turn off the air conditioner. John returns from his vacation a week later to a very chilly home and ultimately, an electric bill nearly $300 more than usual for the summer months. Should that expense make the search unreasonable (and thus, suppress the evidence) or should a court write it off as de minimis? 138 At first glance, it seems absurd that the evidence should be found inadmissible because of an increase in a criminal's electric bill. However, the focus cannot be on criminality-suppose no drugs had been found; perhaps John was mistaken for his twin brother. Now, he cannot pay his electric bill or feed his children. As one scholar noted, "A rule that excludes evidence only if there is no evidence to exclude is self-defeating." 139 Therefore, there should be some point at which this intrusion is found to be unreasonable. Perhaps $300 is still a de minimis amount, but where is the line? 140 The Bailey 141 -Cardwell 142 standard would say that if John had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his air conditioner, the search should be found unreasonable. Under 138 There are, of course, a multitude of related hypotheticals. Is stopping a car for an extended period of time when the person has to run the heat because of the cold weather de minimis? Can a GPS device be placed on a car when, although a very small amount, it does decrease the gas mileage of the vehicle (though this placement was struck down on other grounds in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012))? These are all issues that have arisen with modern technology and were incomprehensible at the time the Fourth Amendment was written. 139 Connally, 143 where $5.00 was held not to be de minimis, so too might John's expenses. Suppose we try to set a bright line rule for this type of situation. Do we try to set the amounts high to prevent this argument except in extreme situations? Should a gap be left to interpretation of the courts, and if so, do we allow courts to look at various factors such as the person's income to decide application? And finally, suppose we consider all such similar cases to be unreasonable within the Fourth Amendment. Would opening the refrigerator to search for drugs become an unconstitutional intrusion because law enforcement let the cold air out?
The above hypothetical presents the obvious issues with the de minimis doctrine, and demonstrates that there is not a good solution. Justice Stevens's suggestion of creating a test would work somewhat easily with some situations, but setting an outer boundary in Fourth Amendment cases just seems as if it would complicate the situation.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the de minimis doctrine's long but largely undeveloped history, the Supreme Court has used it to justify many decisions. From restricting First Amendment freedoms to criticizing state reapportionment plans, the doctrine has made a significant impact. However, none of the applications is perhaps more influential as it has been on the Fourth Amendment. Through the de minimis doctrine's application, the Court has ruled that there is an entire area of governmental action that cannot be construed as unreasonable because it is too minimal to be considered a worthwhile interest. While applied to a variety of cases concerning the Fourth Amendment, its use remains largely ambiguous. There has been no attempt to create any sort of test, and although some clues have been given as to what is considered de minimis and what is not, lower courts have struggled with these cases as the "clues" are nowhere near bright line rules. However, as this Article has shown, there is no good resolution to the issue. All solutions either result in unintelligible results or leave us with no better standard than we have now-a requirement of evaluating reasonableness. Perhaps, though, the Founding Fathers included the word "unreasonable" for a reason. Unlike other rights, the Fourth Amendment is not strict and absolute, but a weighing of several factors and interests, and the doctrine is simply a way to eliminate those cases which are, for a lack of a better term, de minimis.
